Archive for December, 2009

The past decade (2000-2009) has been one with many important events in world history, some of which has indirectly influenced upon my life.  As a young man looking back, it’s incredible to think of these event and I think of Daniel in the Bible, of how Daniel as a young man has lived through some of the important events in world history.  As a Christian, I believe in the providence of God in World History.  Here’s some of my reflection of events that has shaped this decade.

1.) September 11th, 2001

How many Americans can forget that day seeing it on TV and the nonstop news that fateful Tuesday.  I was just a recent high school graduate, going to community college.  I woke up that morning and saw the news.  Immediately I suspected Osama Bin Laden.  I have just learned about Osama Bin Laden a few years prior to the twin embassy bombing, that he will probably be the 21st century’s new terror threat– a prediction too far accurate.  I drove to school listening to the radio and heard the broadcaster cry–the tower has collapsed.  I thought the guy was joking but when I got to school and no one was in class but all over the TV in the cafeteria…I knew it was real.

A month prior to 9-11, I was sworn in with the Marines, and my departure to boot camp was going to be the following summer.  I had doubts whether or not this was the right step in my life, and whether it was God’s will that I enlist with the Marines.  I was nervous that I would have regrets.  9-11 sealed the deal and from that day forth there was no question that I was going to be a Marine.

2.) War in Iraq

The war started on my best friend’s birthday- March 20th, 2003.  I was 19, turn 20.  For weeks when I was in Iraq, I couldn’t believe I was in Iraq.  The toughest time wasn’t when I was in Iraq, but those days and night before I even got to Kuwait.  On the eve of the war, being in the states was hard– I thought about dying, injuries, miseries and chemical attacks often.  It was so surreal then to think of what might happen–meanwhile people in Civilian land was worried about things as trivial as not wanting to take finals as their biggest stress.

Looking back, there was very little in Iraq.  But when you were there at that time, you thought of it as a big deal in 2003.  I know that out of all my friends in the Marines and the Army, they have been through so much more than I have.  God protected me and blessed me much.  I enjoyed going out on patrols or convoy operations alot when I was there–it felt like you were doing something incredible.  But my biggest joy at the end of the day, was spending time with other Marines and Navy Corpsmen, going through Bible studies…and evangelizing to the Iraqis who asked questions about the Bible.

3.) John Kerry belittle troops at my Alma Matter, Pasadena City College

My sister was there when he gave this speech, and was surprised that he said that.  The ironic part was that I went to Pasadena City College, I worked hard academically and did go to Iraq.  When he gave this speech, I have already transferred from PCC to UCLA, majoring in Political Science.

4.) Social Networking Phenomenon (Xanga)

Who would have thought in the 90s that there would be fast speed internet and the phenomon of blogging and social network online?  Having been on Facebook and wordpress, I still have to say some of the most memorable experience was on Xanga.  It was part of real life… the friends made, lives changed, gospel shared, spiritual encouragement, apologetics debates, learning theology and people coming to Christ, and it goes on: suicide attempts being stopped, meeting with missionaries and those deployed in a war zone, being asked to preach because of being on xanga… then there is the mobilization of support and condolences to those who have lost a loved one in Iraq…it was an incredible experience.  To this day, some of the most faithful prayer warriors in my life are those whom I have befriend on Xanga first.

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When it comes to apologetics, there are areas of disagreements among Christians as to the best method in defending the faith.  Taking advantage of these disagreements between Presuppositionalists and non-Presuppositionalists, an atheist lodges an objection towards Presuppositional Apologetics by challenging whether or not Presuppositionalism can account for Christian disagreement:

“Presups claim knowledge from God by revelation, but have not accounted for disagreements among Christians. Presups claim that the presup position itself is a revelation from God, but it seems God has not given this revelation to Christians like X and Y (Editorial note: Actual names removed). A presup might claim that God gives different revelations to different Christians, but this seems to further undermine their position.”

Can Presuppositionalists account for Christian disagreements and surmount the objections raised?  Let’s look more closely at what has been presented:

1.) First off, it’s probably best to tackle this particular atheist’s last sentence first.  He stated that, “A presup might claim that God gives different revelations to different Christians, but this seems to further undermine their position.”  For context, the atheist has stated earlier in the second sentence that “Presups claim that the presup position itself is a revelation from God“, so when he mentioned that a Presuppositionalist might claim that “God gives different revelations to different Christians“, he’s talking about God revealing Presuppositionalism as proper apologetics while to another Christian God has revealed otherwise (that is, “Presuppositionalism is not a proper God-glorifying apologetics”).  To clear up the matter, Presuppositionalist’s do not hold to a position that God might reveal contradictory revelations concerning proper apologetics methodology to two different Christians.  In light of the fact that a necessary presupposition of this objection has wrongly presupposes that Presuppositionalism believes God has presented contradictory revelations to different Christians, this objection does not stand.

2.) A closer look at the second sentence demonstrates that this atheist does not know the nature of how “Presups claim knowledge from God by revelation” (from the first sentence).  In his second sentence, he stated the following: “Presups claim that the presup position itself is a revelation from God, but it seems God has not given this revelation to Christians like X and Y (Editorial note: Actual names removed)“.  In what ways is “the presup position itself is a revelation from God“?  Presuppositionalists believes that Presuppositionalism is a system of apologetic derived from God’s special revelation, namely the Bible.  It seems that the objector does not understand that Presuppositionalism is arrived at on the basis of God’s revelation from Scripture rather than revelation by the means of some kind of individualized personal esoteric experience allegedly from God.  Somehow the atheist mistakenly thought that Presuppositionalism is revealed to Christians through some kind of miraculous encounter in a vision, etc (which would explain why he gave the objection that he did gave in sentence three).   Due to the atheist’s misunderstanding of the nature of the revelation which Presuppositionalism is based upon, he states that “it seems God has not given this revelation to Christians like X and Y.”  However, since the basis for Presuppositionalism is from God’s revelation found in the Scriptures, the atheist cannot say that “God has not given this revelation to Christians like X and Y.”  God has given His Word, the Bible, to Christians.  The Bible does have something to say about the task, the parameters and method of apologetics.

3.) Having dealt with the difficulties raised by this atheist in his second and third sentences, the main force of his objection is found in the first sentence: “Presups claim knowledge from God by revelation, but have not accounted for disagreements among Christians.”  Obviously, the objector does not think that Presuppositionalism can not account for disagreements among Christians concerning apologetics methodology (Presuppositionalism or non-Presuppositionalism).  However, Presuppositionalism can account for why Christian disagreement exists (including in the spheres of Christian apologetics).  Asking whether or not one can “account” for something (in this case, the phenomenon of Christian disagreements) is in its very nature an internal critique.  That is, seeing if one’s worldview can “account” for something is really asking if that person can rationally explain the existence of the thing or event in question within the person’s own worldview.   In light of Presuppositionalism’s understanding of man’s sin, the effect of man’s sin and man’s finiteness, the existence of Christian disagreement does make sense in the Presuppositionalist’s perspective.  It not only make sense, it is expected to happen if Presuppositionalism’s understanding of those three areas are true.  Presuppositionalism believes the Bible when it says that everyone is sinful (Romans 3:23), which means also that everyone in his sinful nature rebel against God and what God’s Word says (cf. Genesis 3).  The consequence of man’s sin has affected every aspect of man, including his will, emotions, will and mind.  The noetic effect of sin include man suppressing the truth of God in his mind and will (Romans 1:18ff.).  While a Christian no longer sins the same way as a non-Christian (reigning sin), a Christian does have remaining sin where he can violate what God says.  Thus, because a Christian is not perfect and ranges in various degrees of thinking Biblically, it should not be a surprise to find that some Christians could even sin by not obeying fully the Biblical parameter of apologetics.  Depending on where the Christian is in the process of sanctification, the less he is sanctified in thinking Biblically, the more likely the possibility he disagrees with what the Word says, and the more likely that one would find him disagreeing with Christians who are more consistent with Scripture’s principle for apologetics.  The effect of sin has also impacted man’s noetic abilities, where one can also think irrationality, be mistaken in his reasoning, and assume bad presuppositions that are not biblical.  Hence, the effect of sin also lead one to expect Christians to make mistakes on their reasoning of apologetics methodology.  Afterall, man is not God, for man’s knowledge is finite and limited.  He might not capture all the truth fully.  These three aspects (man’s sin, effect of sin, and finiteness) are Christian truths that even non-presuppositionalists would hold to, but for some reason non-presuppositionalists would not accept the logical conclusion of these truths when it comes to the application of apologetics.  Presuppositionalism can account for Christian disagreements, including disagreements on apologetics.


This essay has shown that Presuppositionalism can account for Christian disagreement, and that the reality of Christian disagreement is not an objection to Presuppositionalism.  Along the way, two other objections depending on the first were looked at also.  Of course, it is one thing to be able to account for Christian disagreement with Presuppositionalism, it’s another thing to see if their objections stands.  This series have already looked at some of the Christians objections offered, and another Christian objection to Presuppositional apologetics will the subject of the next installment in this series.


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In the landscape of Christian apologetics, Presuppositional Apologetics is not the only school of apologetics.  There are other “house” that’s suppose to provide to Christians a defense of their faith, made up of different materials than the “house” of Presuppositionalism.  Sometimes, when members of another school of apologetics criticize Presuppositionalism, it exposes more of the weak materials of their apologetic (hay and straws, if we are continuing with our analogy) rather than the weakness of the brick house of presuppositionalism.  Consider the following criticism of Presuppositional Apologetics from a self-confessing “evidentialist” :

“The heart of the presuppositionalist system seems to be this: an insistence that “knowledge” has two components. First, the thing itself, and second, a judgment about the thing. We know the fact, and the meaning of the fact. Otherwise it is not knowledge. This definition goes all the way back to Plato.
If we accept this definition, presuppositionalism follows automatically, because a norm that yields judgments is a presupposition. Evidentialists do not accept this definition of knowledge! Evidentialists use the “normal” definition of knowledge, which is everything recorded by the mind. To recall knowledge, I do not need a norm of judgment; all I need is an “association” of an experience with another experience.”

From the first sentence above, it is clear that the person wants to critique an essential rather minor point of Presuppositionalism when he stated: “The heart of the presuppositionalist system seems to be this“.  The essence of Presuppositional Apologetics that he focuses on is Presuppositionalism’s “ insistence that “knowledge” has two components“, namely what he described in the second sentence as “the thing itself” and “a judgment about the thing“.  He then goes on to describe (roughly stated) Presuppositionalism’s epistemology in the following three sentences (sentence three to five).   One can see that the evidentialist’s objection to Presuppositionalism here is epistemological in nature.

His objection, fleshed out in the sixth sentence to the ninth sentence, deserves a closer look:

1.) One of the aspect of Presuppositional Apologetics (though not exclusive to it) is the call for Christians to be conscious of their own and other’s presuppositions.  That includes being conscious of definitions.  Commendably, this particular evidentialist is quite “Presuppositional” when he critiqued Presuppositionalism’s epistemology beginning at the level of definition, specifically the definition of knowledge : “If we accept this definition, presuppositionalism follows automatically, because a norm that yields judgments is a presupposition” (Sentence six).  Of course, he rejects presuppositional apologetics’ definition of knowledge: “Evidentialists do not accept this definition of knowledge! ” (Sentence seven).  The crux of the matter is whether or not knowledge requires norms (what he calls “a judgment about the thing“), and if norms are required, to put it in his own words, “presuppositionalism follows automatically, because a norm that yields judgments is a presupposition” (Sentence six).  Thus, to vindicate Presuppositionalism, the burden of the Presuppositionalist is to establish instances in which norms are required for knowledge.  On the other hand, the other side has to show that norms has nothing to do with the formulation of knowledge.

2.) His rejection of the presuppositionalist’s requirement for knowledge (sentence six) did not just happen in a vacuum.  The reason he rejected the presuppositionalist’s position is because he has his own definition of what knowledge is: “Evidentialists use the “normal” definition of knowledge, which is everything recorded by the mind” (Sentence Eight).  Surely there is a conflict of definitions, yet how do we know (did you catch that?) the correct definition?  This evidentialist believes his definition is correct but reject the presuppositionalist’s definition.    Ironically, by rejecting one definition and embracing another, he is actually presupposing norms.  For one thing, he assume the law of non-contradiction in his reasoning process since both conflicting definition of knowledge cannot be true. Secondly, he assumes that incorrect definitions “ought not” to be accepted while correct definitions “ought” to accepted.  Such obligation betrays the operation of norms in the process of knowledge.  Thirdly, he assume as a rule or norm that an arbitrary definition should not be accepted.   In other words,  knowledge (including knowledge of the proper definition of knowledge) presupposes a normative aspect: In one aspect, this debate is epistemological in nature (how do I know what definition to accept over another?) and yet there is also a normative aspect governing the process of acquiring true knowlege (laws of logic, obligation to accept the truth, etc).  It is ironic to point out in light of the evidentialist’s rejection of norms in knowledge, he would describe his definition as the “normal” definition of knowledge.

3.) Again, one of the factor for why this evidentialist rejected the presuppositionalist’s definition of knowledge  is because he already has decided ahead of time how knowledge should be defined.  In contrast to Presuppositionalism, “Evidentialists use the “normal” definition of knowledge, which is everything recorded by the mind” (Sentence Eight).  This definition of knowledge (knowledge is “everything recorded by the mind”) is an inadequate one.  In order for someone to know something, it also has to be true because it would be incorrect to say you “know” something, when that something (content of knowledge) is false.  In light of this, knowledge as “everything recorded by the mind”(Sentence Eight) fail to account for the fact that “everything recorded by the mind” is not necessarily true.  For instance, what is recorded in the mind at times might be mistakenly accepted to be true when it is not.  Magical shows and optical illusion is such an example.  Also, what is recorded in the mind might at times turn out to be down-right false.  Reading a false scam letter, one records it to one mind of what is read but recording it in the mind does not make something become true.  You can not know it is true or false just on the basis of it being stored into your mind.  The point here is that there is a lot more going on when someone knows something than just “everything recorded by the mind”(Sentence Eight).

4.) Being against norms in the process of knowledge, this person substitute norms with association instead: “To recall knowledge, I do not need a norm of judgment; all I need is an “association” of an experience with another experience” (Sentence Nine).  Yet, “association” of one experience with another is not an adequate substitution for norms in knowledge.  For one thing, there can be false association between experiences.  There are many ways that false associations can be construed: there’s Bandwagon fallacy (wrongly associating the truth of a proposition to it’s popularity), straw man fallacy (wrongly associating a position to be that of an opponent when it is not), casual fallacy (wrong associating two experiences that one is the cause of the other experience and that the other experience is the effect when it is not so), etc.  To recognize logical fallacies that involves fallacious associations is to make “a judgment about the thing” or “things”.   Again, norms of thoughts and reasoning are required in assessing what are relevant and irrelevant associations.


With an epistemology contrary to that of Presuppositionalism that is inadequate for proper knowledge, self-refuting in nature and which the arguments against Presuppositionalism’s epistemology ends up presupposing the truth of what it is trying to refute instead, is this opponent’s “house” of apologetics made of suitable material for Christian defense?


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Merry Christmas to you all!

Remember that Jesus is the reason for Christmas

A Veritas Domain entry from the past here of a Christmas poem that I think is still relevant about Christmas

I reposted it here:

The Story Of The Birth Of Jesus

Once a cold night in December,

Began a story we all remember,

With angels singing praise,

And nearby Shepherds daze.

That night in a lonely manger,

Could not have been lonelier,

For a young pregnant virgin,

With no room in the inn.

A Holy Child was born,

In a place that’s not adorn,

For the Child was a King,

Salvation He will bring.

A bright star marked the sky,

And Wise Men even came by,

Searching for the mighty One,

God’s Holy Son.

Shepherds who worked at night,

Saw an angel gleaming bright,

As they headed for the manger,

That one night in December.

In that lonely manger,

There lay the Savior,

By the Virgin Mother,

And Joseph besides her.

Of what they witness in the stall,

They praise God for what they saw.

And when they went away that night,

From that manger site,

The Good news got around,

That in a little Judea town,

A little child wrapped warmly,

Was a child of God’s Glory.

This story, now many years old,

And millions of times retold,

Reached many different places,

And all kind of races.

Many have been blessed,

Because of the birth of Jesus.

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The folks over at Reformed Forum has an audio podcast review of the Documentary “Collision”

It can be heard here

The documentary itself covers Presuppositionalist (of the Van Tillian presuasion) Doug Wilson and his interaction with atheist Christopher Hitchens

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The new movie “Avatar” is sure to be the weekend box office hit this weekend, when the count comes in

Russell D. Moore, Dean at Southern Seminary has written his review here

Steve Hays has his short comment here

And Patrick Chan’s review of the movie can be found here

From these guys comment it seems to be an excellent movie in regards to CGI and graphics, but has somewhat of a political subtext.

It it important for Christians to also be aware of philosophical undercurrent not only of what they are reading but also what they are watching in the theatre!

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Fascinating statistics.


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John MacArthur’s word on the legacy of Oral Roberts:


The featured article in Pulpit Magazine is titled, “Measuring Oral Roberts’ Influence

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2 Part series over at Gospel Living Blog, they are food for thought for the Christian. Pastoral in nature.



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Purchase: Amazon

Clark himself has admitted that he is not a textual critic (10) , that he himself is not writing to address professional scholars (38). But that does not mean Clark believe he has nothing to say about textual criticism, since textual criticism itself can be criticized on the basis of logical analysis, as Clark himself stated: “much of textual criticism cannot claim immunity from logical analysis” (11). In reviewing this book, I agree with Clark here that logical analysis of textual criticism is a legitimate endeavor, though I don’t know of any textual critic who thinks that somehow textual criticism is immune from logical analysis. This book by Gordon Clark, “Logical Criticism of Textual Criticism” is itself not immune to logical criticism either and to that end I will pursue in this review.

What is the purpose of this book? Reading the opening of this book, Clark never makes it clear. Towards the middle of the book, one wonders what is the direction of this book and the big picture of what Clark is trying to criticize. Sadly, he states this most clearly towards the end, with his conclusion: “..we conclude that the type of criticism underlying the Revised Standard Version, the New American Standard, and other versions is inconsistent with its own stated criteria, inconsistent in its results, and inconsistent with the objective evidence. Its method is that of unsupported aesthetic speculation. If we want to get closer to the very words of God, we must pay attention to Hodges, Farstad, Pickering and The New King James Version” (49). Chiefly, from the stated conclusion, the book’s purpose is one that concern with textual criticism methodology, where the methodology of the NASB, RSV are criticized and the methods of the NKJV and scholars like Hodges and Farstad (the Majority Text school) are upheld to be be closer to the Word of God. That might be his conclusion, but does this follow from the content of the book?

He favors the school of the Majority Text championed by Zane Hodges and Farstad (39), but I wished the book would have defended why he favored this school’s methodology. Rather than an exposition and defense of the Majority Text view, he praises it’s proponents work and simply state them as requiring patience to work through, having over 150 entries on bibliographies (11), that these works refute detractors (11-12) are scholarly and less speculative and too complex to reproduce in the book itself (40). As Gordon Clark’s other works have taught me as a younger Christian, it’s one thing to assert a premise for a conclusion is true and another thing to demonstrate it!

Clark has written in this book that “If the critics are not interested in the validity of their methodology, but nonetheless make use of manuscript evidence, I would like to recommend some studies of their professional resources” (11). Though Clark does make use of manuscript evidence in this book, Clark was himself not consistent in his failure to consider the validity of his preferred method (Majority Text school), which he recommend others to do in his own book.

Readers will see Clark employing a method of counting the number of text to support a reading without consideration of the external history of the text itself. For instance, for Romans 6:16 Clark argues on the basis of 30 verses 2 manuscripts for a particular reading, but found it as an appalling inconsistencies that the adopted reading in 6:11 has a majority of textual support (for another example, see Clark’s comment on Romans 8:23). Clark then takes a jibe against Textual Criticism as an “art” by straw-manning textual criticism saying “If you enjoy Rembrandt, it is Byzantine and bad; if you enjoy cubism, you are a great scholar. Aesthetics is decisive” (44). Among other things, Clark is equivocating “art”. More importantly, Clark fails to understand that textual criticism is not just counting numbers of support but there is a need to weigh the evidence in light of the manuscript’s history, date, family, etc. Curiously, Clark should know better, for he himself acknowledges that the weight of each manuscript testimony must be taken into consideration, when he stated that text D “is almost as bad as some American translations. Acts would do much better without it, and them” (42). For him to weigh the evidential value of text D, but then to somehow forget about evidential weight of manuscripts in other occasion is simply unfortunate.

Though Clark does not give a full explanation for the NKJV method, he does have an interesting method in his criticism of other schools.

A favorite method of Clark’s argumentation throughout the corpus of his work that is evident here as well is his method of dismissing his opponent’s suggestion of a contrary possibility as being nothing more than speculation.  While he does this concerning argument by others, Clark nevertheless engages in the same practice of arguing by suggesting the possibility of the contrary. Readers can see this in his short interaction of the three canon of textual criticism.  Note Clark’s use of the word “might”, when he argues against weighing the manuscript’s evidence versus counting a simple majority of text (that happens to be Byzantine): “That the numerical superiority of the Byzantine text might have been due to its early widespread acceptance of that type as being closest to the autographs does not seem to impress them” (32).  Note also the words “if” in his argument in an earlier part of the book: “If a score or two score manuscripts have a single ancestor, it implies that a score or two score copyists believed that ancestor to be faithful to the autographs.  But if a manuscript has not a numerous progeny, as is the case with B’s ancestor, one may suspect that the early scribes doubted its value.  Possibly the early orthodox Christians knew that B was corrupt, while the later heretics were less interested in wasting time copying their own altered text.” (15). Clark’s method of criticism provides his own self-defeater.  In addition, Clark fails to acknowledge the reason why those he criticizes believes in weighing the manuscript versus a simple count of majority reading. Which explains why Clark would chide Textual critics of non-Majority Text school with the inability to accept a simple majority as a criteria that is good enough.  The majority of the text happens to be later (Byzatine), which acceptance Clark favored because he believed this family enjoy “early widespread acceptance of that type as being closest to the autographs does not seem to impress them” (32).  This assumption is simply not true, the Byzantine was not necessarily widely accepted, as there are other families of text in existence.  A simple counting of manuscripts is also defective in that the Byzantine reading became the majority over the other families not necessarily because everyone adopted them widespreadly, but because of the discontinuation of Greek in the rest of the world where Latin’s translation was adopted in the West and other languages elsewhere.  Hence, it would be expected that the majority of the Greek text would be Byzantine and coming much later (which does happen to be the case).

Clark employs arguments that is base on suggestion of contrary possibilities with his interaction with the other canons of textual criticism.  Concerning the canon of preferring the tougher reading over the simpler reading as the original, Clark objected: “But it is also possible, for a number of reasons—fatigue, brilliance, the mispronunciation of a reader—that he changed an easy reading into something more difficult” (16).  Concerning the principle of preferring shorter reading to the longer, that the rationale is because scribes tend to preserve all the readings in the copy, Clark replied: “But could not some scribe, if he had different manuscripts before him and were not listening, with a room full of copyists, to a reader—could he not have been sufficiently devout to remember the Scriptural injunction neither to add nor to subtract?” (16).  Again, it is important to note Clark’s self-defeater that raising possibilities ought to be simply dismissed because engaging in such a pursuit is “purely speculative”.

His argument by doubtful questioning and skepticism also has its limitation.  Attacking those who have been influenced by Westcott and Hort in their dependence on the manuscript Aleph and B, Clark raises the question: “Why could not Aleph and B have come from an earlier proto-Arian text or a Marcionite deception?” (32).  Yet, Clark accepts Aleph and B as manuscript evidence throughout the book.  This planting of questions of doubt is also counter-productive towards Clark’s goal in the book of giving confidence of the believers in the manuscripts and the Word of God.  The maxim that the end does not justify the means has birthed a similar truism: The means that undermine the end is no means to the end.

Another method to support his conclusion is in criticism of the “ratings” of the critical Greek texts. He himself explained that: “the consideration of this material will go far to enhancing the reputation of the New King James Version in comparison with the Revised Standard Version and others that accept the results of Aland, Metzger and their associates” (43). A closer look reveal that Clark was rather sloppy in his stated task.

There are times when Clark failed to interact with the entirety of the argument of those he criticizes.  Concerning Mark 5:1, he mocked Metzger citation of Alexandrian and Western types of text for reading γερασηνων, by insisting the “superior external evidence” for his reading, and then went off criticizing Metzger’s sole argument is his explanation of how the text might have possibly experienced a scribal assimilation.  He writes that “The critics’ argument is mainly unsupported speculation” (28).  This is rather dishonest on the part of Clark, because reading Metzger’s section on Mark 5:1 in full (rather than just the quote cited by Clark), the evidence Metzger cites was built largely on the manuscript evidence of the earliest Alexandrian and Western text types.  He should have instead gave his argument against the evidential value of the Alexandrian and Western text types if he disagreed with Metzger since this was the core of Metzger’s argument, instead of mocking Metzger’s possible explanation for how the variant reading arise.  On page 20, Clark is again rather reductionistic of Metzger’s reasoning.  Clark stated concerning Metzger’s textual commentary, that “Metzger’s note says that his Committee preferred ιδων  [idon].  Their reason is that seeing is less appropriate than knowing, and that therefore seeing must be original while knowing must be a correction.  Naturally one cannot expect the original author to have used the more appropriate word, can one?  It is the logic of the reasoning that I am contesting, not the genuineness of ιδων.  The defense of ιδων is in its superior textual evidence” (20).  But when one refers to Metzger’s work one find that this is not the only line of evidence cited, where Metzger discusses also the testimony of the και in the combined testimony of the text and it’s relationship with ιδων.  Futhermore, Metzger’s commentary “A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament” has clearly stated in the first edition (which Clark used during the writing of his book) that the text-volume itself has already cited the important manuscript witnesses as evidence for their adopted reading and “the reader of the commentary will be able to supplement the partial citation of evidence by consulting the fuller apparatus in the text volume” Metzger, 1970, page viii).  It is rather disappointing to see Clark failure to recognize that the commentary was to supplement the argument given within the textual apparatus of the UBS Greek Text, which led to his reduction of believing that Metzger’s only argument is found in the commentary, and thus to view Metzger’s argument being absent of interacting with the superior textual evidence.  The two works (the textual critical apparatus in the UBS and the Commentary itself) are complementary of each other and the commentary is not meant to be a stand alone work of providing Metzger’s argument.  Failure to recognize this has not allowed Clark to interact fully of the arguments of those he criticizes.

Actually, it seems the book was in general rather sloppily written and put together. The chapter on Romans has a section on 1 Corinthians 1:13 (45). Commenting on Revelation 13:18’s textual issue he jabs against Scofield interpretation of Romans 2-3 (48-49), which is inconsistent from someone who himself acknowledge the distinction between theological versus textual problem (44-45). Sometimes Clark is sloppy by not being clear of who it is he is interacting with. For instance, concerning Luke 19:25 he mentioned that “they gave it a D rating…” (34). But who are “they” that he is talking about? Metzger in the UBS does not give the verse a D rating but an A, so it’s definitely not Metzger that he’s talking about. Who is the “they” Clark was referring to? Clark doesn’t say, nor does he say who “they” are in the context.

Furthermore, Clark is at times somewhat belittling towards his readers, saying things like how the tough matters in the book are things for the readers to survive through the boredom of (43), or when he writes, “Overcome with fatigue the patient reader will be overjoyed to learn that Revelation now ends this study” (46). Surveying how the chapters focusing on Matthew through Revelation gets generally shorter and shorter, and how the chapter on Matthew began commenting chronologically textual issues even those that are rather minor and what Clark himself admits as trivial (19), it’s probably ironic to say that perhaps Clark was the one who has become fatigued with the task. Clark is not to be blamed that the task is difficult, but given the shortness of time and energy, he could have been a much more wise steward of time and energy if he would have concentrated on the major textual issues instead.

Some of the problems he pointed out is legitimate. It is also fortunate to point out that Textual Critics sometimes do abandon weaker readings for the better reading over time. For instance, Clark makes a good case for “Lord” in Luke 24:3, which the Nestle text put in double-brackets to show doubt until the twenty-sixth edition when they finally are led to the conclusion of the “Lord” reading. The same can be said of Luke 24:9.  Sometimes textual critics over time improves on giving a legitimate higher rating from previous rating. One can see this if they compare Clark’s complaint of bad ratings to updated editions’ ratings. For instance, Clark wanted a higher rating for the inclusion of the entire verse of Luke 24:12, since it was at his time rated D, but now the UBS rates it a B. Among many other examples of the state of improvement of ratings of Clark’s complaint is also 1 Corinthians 1:13 (from C rating to an A in UBS 4th Edition).  Concerning Mark 1:41, Clark writes that “the rating should at least be B instead of only C.  Note also that while the Aland text gives it C, Metzger in his Textual Commentary reduces it to D.  This is indefensible” (27).  Subsequently, Metzger’s second addition did rate it a B.  Still another example: Clark criticizes Aland’s rating of Matthew 7:13 “gate” with a C.  Here I  agree, and fortunately in the UBS Fourth edition it is now rated an A.  I must also caution that there are also readings that Clark argues for that I am in agreement with him and yet those readings are currently not held by the textual critics he criticized.  For instance, Clark argues persuasively concerning Luke 9:59, that the “Lord” there is the original reading in light of the strong attestatation of various families of manuscripts and the papyrus 45 and 75, yet strangely this is not agreed by the critics Clark cited.  In light of the fact that the field of textual criticism does progress in accepting changes for the better, this does lead to questions concerning Clark’s attack on textual criticism: Is Textual Criticism and Textual Critics in general the big boogie man that Clark has portrayed them to be?

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Gary DeMar of American Vision has this video up on Youtube concerning Frank Schaeffer

On this blog I have posted in the past concerning Frank Schaeffer, including useful links and my writing concerning the reasoning behind his angry rhetoric here and here

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Great teaching sermon of the Messianic reference found in Psalm 118

The sermon can be found here:


Dr. Greg Harris, professor of Bible Exposition at The Master’s Seminary and Teaching Pastor at Lake Hills Community Church gives a wonderful insight in this Chapel Message, and also opens the sermon with a funny introduction

I hope to do an entry some time on my thoughts of the importance of Messianic Prophecies within a Van Tillian Framework of apologetics

This is a wonderful arsenal in the Presuppositionalist’s toolbelt

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Purchase: Amazon

Many of Dooyeweerd’s work have not been translated into English and those who are familiar with Dooyeweerd’s philosophy are typically among Reformed Christians. Given how little of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy exists in English, this particular book is unique in that it goes beyond just an introduction to this Dutch Reformed philosopher but also constructive criticism from a capable theologically Reformed philosopher. The author Ronald Nash does a good job introducing the gist of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy and ends the book summarizing the positive contribution and negative criticism of “Amsterdam” philosophy. Some might have been aware of Nash’s critique at times has the flavor of Gordon Clark, with the criticism of definitions and possible equivocation. Nash does a fair job of giving Dooyeweerd the benefit of the doubt and the bulk of his criticism is quite legitimate. Most serious in my view is Dooyeweerd’s concept of religion as distinct from theology, and whether the aspects or modes relate to one another as the way Dooyeweerd always states it. Their is no doubt that Dooyeweerd’s general insight is valuable in Christian philosophy and apologetics such as the concept of the inter-relationship of spheres and distinct laws for different modes, or how the autonomous man’s idolatry tend to reduce one sphere as absolute and thereby result in irrationality. This book takes Dooyeweerd’s contribution seriously yet critically and no doubt a benefit to the reader.

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This is over at Sovereign Grace Website and I thought it is good.

Original link is at http://www.sovereigngraceministries.org/Blog/post/Hunting-Tiger-Woods.aspx.

I posted it in its entirety here.

Tiger Woods need to know the severity of his sins in the sight of God.  Knowing this, Tiger Woods need to hear the Gospel, because nothing else can take away his guilt, but Jesus, if Tiger Woods should bow his knees to Jesus.  Tiger Woods need to repent to be saved from the Wrath of God.

Tiger Woods wants his privacy back.

He wants the media entourage to disappear from his life.

He wants to be left alone so he can manage his personal problems in private.

Not a chance.

The story began unfolding in the early hours of last Friday when he crashed his Cadillac Escalade into a tree and a fire hydrant near his Florida home. He refused to speak with the police about the incident, raising curiosity about the circumstances. The story has now escalated into allegations of marital infidelity, and that generated a blog post from Tiger that stated, “I have let my family down and I regret those transgressions with all of my heart.” This statement by Tiger has led most to believe that the allegations of infidelity are true.

Hunted by the Media

As expected, the allegations of adultery involving a public figure are attracting a media pile-on. This is a big story with a big audience and it’s a story that will not disappear soon. Tiger Woods is being hunted by the media.

But let us make sure we do not join the hunt. A Christian’s response to this story should be distinctly different. We should not be entertained by the news. We should not have a morbid interest in all the details. We should be saddened and sobered. We should pray for this man and even more for his wife.

And we can be sure that in the coming days we will be in conversations with friends and family where this topic will emerge. And when it does, we can avoid simply listening to the latest details and speculations, and avoid speaking self-righteously, but instead we can humbly draw attention to the grace of God in the gospel.

Hunted by Sin

But Tiger is being hunted by something more menacing than journalists. Tiger’s real enemy is his sin, and that’s an enemy much more difficult to discern and one that can’t be managed in our own strength. It’s an enemy that never sleeps.

Let me explain.

Sin Lies

The Bible in general, and the book of Proverbs in particular, reveals an unbreakable connection between our character, our conduct, and the consequences of our actions. These three are inseparable and woven by God into His created order.

Deception is part of sin’s DNA. Sin lies to us. It seeks to convince us that sin brings only pleasure, that it carries no consequences, and that no one will discover it. Sin works hard to make us forget that character, conduct, and consequences are interconnected. And when we neglect this relationship—when we think our sins will not be discovered—we ultimately mock God.

Sin Hunts

We’ve all experienced it: Sin lies to us. We take the bait. And then sin begins to hunt us.

One commentator on Proverbs articulated this truth like this: “The irony of a life of rebellion is that we begin by pursuing sin…and end up being pursued by it!….You can ‘be sure your sin will find you out’ (Num. 32:23…).”* In other words, sin comes back to hunt us.

In light of this fact, sin is an enemy Tiger can’t manage. He can’t shape this story like he does a long iron on a par 5. Tiger doesn’t need a publicity facelift; Tiger needs a Savior. Just like me. And just like you. And if by God’s grace he repents and trusts in the person and work of Christ, Tiger will experience the fruit of God’s promise that “whoever conceals his transgressions will not prosper, but he who confesses and forsakes them will obtain mercy” (Proverbs 28:13).


Tiger cannot intimidate this enemy like he can Pebble Beach or any of the field of professional golfers. And there is no privacy he can claim from this enemy, regardless of his resolve, his silence, or the name painted on his yacht. It’s likely Tiger only perceives the press hunting him out of a vain “curiosity about public figures.” But Tiger is being hunted and hounded by a far greater foe: the consequences of his sin.

And this story should humble and sober us. It should make us ask: Are there any so-called “secret sins” in my life? Is there anything I have done that I hope nobody discovers? Is there anything right now in my life that I should confess to God and the appropriate individuals?

And this should leave us more amazed by grace because there, but for the grace of God, go I.


*John A. Kitchen, Proverbs (Fearn, Scotland: Mentor, 2006), 294–295.

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Live Action, a prolife organization, has once again produce another video of Planned Parenthood lies in a new investigative video released today

Let others know, post this video yourself and share the links with others

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