Often it’s heard that Cornelius Van Til, Covenantal apologetics or Presuppositionalism do not believe in giving evidences for the truth of Christianity when in actuality the issue is that they are concern about one’s philosophy of evidence that interprets or misinterprets “evidences.”
A recent Westminster Theological Journal article might be of interests to the readers, which is made available by the writer, is concern with Cornelius Van Til, evidences and John Locke’s evidentialism. I have provided links to two different articles on PDF related to Van Til, evidences and philosophy of evidence:
1.) Christianity and Evidentialism: Van Til and Locke on Facts and Evidence.
2.) A Proposal on the Occasion and the Method of Presenting Evidence within a Van Tillian Framework.
[…] Recent Westminster Theological Journal articles on Van Til’s view of Apologetic Evidence via SlimJim HERE […]
Thanks for these Jim – something else to read! These would move up the list though.
Have you read Van Til’s Apologetic by Greg Bahnsen? I’m thinking about buying it.
I do think Van Til’s apologetics by Greg Bahnsen is good. Its a book to slowly work through, though I did not finish it. I went only half way. This was the work that finally convinced me to be a Presuppositionalist.
[…] I bring Zimmerman up more for the point of illustrating how the way people present “evidence” or images matters and that as discerning Christians we must always be careful to not let images alone sway us, since we know that every picture is itself limited to a certain rectangular and square shape of an event or person from a certain angle in a certain time, etc. My point is only to note how the manner of presentation is not neutral and Christians must learn to realize this, not just only about someone’s innocence or not in trial but also for any other discussion including people’s discussion for or against Christianity. I think the Christian apologist Cornelius Van Til has been insightful here, and you can read our recent posts on resources on Van Til, evidence and philosophy of evidence HERE. […]
[…] Difference 2: Philosophy of evidence matters more than evidence per se. In the past I have mentioned this point in our blog that one’s philosophy of evidence matters more than evidences per se. That is because one’s philosophy of evidence will shape how one interpret the evidence. In other words one’s criteria of evidence will either dismiss something as evidence or accept something as evidence. If someone has a messed up criteria of evidence it might be better to first deal with the philosophy of evidence before you present any evidence. See Van Til, Evidence, and Philosophy of Evidence. […]
[…] Difference 2: Philosophy of evidence matters more than evidence per se. In the past I have mentioned this point in our blog that one’s philosophy of evidence matters more than evidences per se. That is because one’s philosophy of evidence will shape how one interpret the evidence. In other words one’s criteria of evidence will either dismiss something as evidence or accept something as evidence. If someone has a messed up criteria of evidence it might be better to first deal with the philosophy of evidence before you present any evidence. See Van Til, Evidence, and Philosophy of Evidence. […]